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1.  Introduction 
Medical travel, broadly defined as those individuals travelling to another country to 
receive medical care, has been on the rise.1  Although it is hard to estimate its magnitude, some 
estimations point to approximately 20 to 24 million patients worldwide spending an average of 
3,410 U.S. dollars annually, sizing the market at 65-87.5 billion U.S. dollars (Woodman, 2020).  
Much of this medical travel is medical tourism, which is typically characterized by patients 
seeking care elsewhere through their own volition, often against the advice of their local health 
provider, and paying out-of-pocket.2  However, a growing share of medical travel is cross-
border medical care, which refers to health care facilitated by a local health provider under pre-
established regional agreements, as in the case of EU citizens accessing care within EU 
countries.  Unlike medical tourism, cross-border medical care is often reimbursable or paid for 
directly by the responsible government.  Yet, because nations vary in the extent of health 
coverage offered to their residents, these expenditures are never fully reimbursed.  The 
resulting financial burden for countries providing the care can be large and not reciprocal, 
straining regional and country-level finances.   
In Spain, most medical travel is cross-border medical care originating from countries in 
the European Union (EU).  In the EU context, nationals from any of the 27 EU countries, 
Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland visiting another of these countries, are entitled 
to the same health care treatment as nationals from those countries.  Within Europe, Spain 
ranks second, after France, in the number of medical interventions performed on foreigners, 
with 700,000 non-resident patients originating primarily from the United Kingdom, Germany, 
 
1 Rationales for seeking medical treatment in a country other than their own vary, including shorter waiting lists, 
non-availability of a particular treatment in the origin country’s public health care system, the belief that the 
quality of care received will be higher in the foreign country, as well as lower costs (Escuela de Organización 
Industrial, 2013). 
2 The top world destinations in this category are Costa Rica, India, Israel, Malaysia, Mexico, or Singapore (see: 
https://www.patientsbeyondborders.com/media).   
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the Netherlands, and Belgium seeking treatment in 2012 (Escuela de Organización Industrial, 
2013).  In principle, the cost associated with treating these patients –initially covered by the 
Spanish social security system– should be reimbursed by the patients’ governments.  However, 
many times it is not.  As of December 31, 2009, unreimbursed costs amounted to 138 million 
euros (Tribunal de Cuentas, 2012).  In addition, in most cases, this cost does not include 
pharmaceutical provision.  As an example, during 2009, Valencia only issued 304 invoices 
including pharmaceutical services.  In 2009, an audit highlighted that the Spanish government 
spent 441 million euros on medical assistance to non-residents from other European Union 
nations, whereas the cost imposed by Spanish citizens on other European Union countries 
amounted to 46 million euros (Tribunal de Cuentas, 2012).  Close to forty percent of the cost 
was incurred in just one Spanish region: Valencia, which spent 165 million (37.4 percent of 
the total) on medical assistance to non-residents from other European Union nations (Tribunal 
de Cuentas, 2012).  In view of these developments, in 2012, Valencia adopted a new policy 
according to which non-resident individuals treated in one of its hospitals would be directly 
charged for the incurred costs (i.e. Law 9/2011 on fiscal measures, administrative and financial 
management, and organization of the Generalitat).  The purpose was to ensure upfront payment 
for the health services, independently of whether the patient could later seek reimbursement by 
her/his home country.   
Our primary aim is to examine the effectiveness of the new policy in curbing cross-
border medical care hospitalizations and total costs.  A second related aim is to learn about the 
channels through which the policy might be operating, by identifying the components of cross-
border care being impacted –namely, types of intervention (e.g. type of surgical procedures, 
including hip implants, pacemaker implants, and cataracts), duration of treatment/length of 
hospital stay, readmissions, mortality; as well as changes in patient characteristics (i.e. gender, 
age, and origin).   
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Medical travel is a relatively unexplored topic in the health literature due to difficulties 
in finding adequate data.  A 2010 review of the literature on the effects of medical travel in 
destination and origin countries concluded that “additional primary research on the effects of 
medical tourism is needed if the industry is to develop in a manner that is beneficial to citizens 
of both departure and destination countries” (Johnston et al. 2010).  Thus far, most of the 
literature has presented descriptive evidence on the direction of medical tourism flows and on 
its determinants, including the availability, quality, and relative cost of medical treatments 
(Mathijsen 2019; Forgione and Smith 2007; Johnston et al. 2010; Guy et al. 2015; Hanefeld et 
al. 2014; Lunt and Carrera 2010; Lunt and Carrera 2011; Padilla-Meléndez and Del Águila 
Obra 2016; Ramírez de Arellano 2007; Runnels and Carrera 2012).3  This study extends our 
current understanding of travel for medical care by providing causal evidence on the 
effectiveness of policy aimed at managing the financial burden imposed by cross-border 
medical care on some regions.     
To this end, we make use of administrative data on the universe of hospitalizations 
taking place between 2008 and 2015 –that is, four years prior to and four years after the reform, 
from the Ministry of Health, Consumption and Social Welfare –namely, the Spanish Minimum 
Set of Basic Data (MSBD).  This database gathers information directly from public hospitals 
and contains detailed medical records on all hospitalizations at discharge.  Specifically, for 
each entry, we have information on individual and hospital characteristics (including the region 
of hospitalization), estimated cost, diagnosis, whether it involved surgery or was previously 
scheduled, length of hospital stays, readmissions, and mortality.  We focus on hospitalizations 
of non-residents 18 years of age and older who are not pregnant, given the free access to 
medical care of minors and pregnant women.4  Using a quasi-experimental approach, we 
 
3 More information can be found in Mathijsen et al. (2020). 
4 According to Organic Law 4/2000 and Royal Decree 16/2012. 
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exploit the fact that the policy was adopted by one of the 19 regions (also referred to as 
autonomous communities) in Spain to assess its impact on cross-border medical care 
hospitalizations and total costs.  Subsequently, we zoom in to learn about the mechanisms at 
play –focusing on changes in treatments or interventions, patients’ demographic traits, and the 
specifics of each case (as captured by its estimated resource consumption, duration of 
treatment/length of hospital stay, readmissions, mortality, and cost incurred).   
We find that the policy adopted by Valencia helped contain cross-border medical care 
hospitalizations and costs in public hospitals.  These effects did not predate the reform, are 
long-lasting, and are not observed when alternative reform dates are used in placebo checks.  
The impacts also prove robust to changes in the composition of the control and treated groups, 
to the time window used as reference, and to the methodology employed.  Finally, the 
effectiveness of the reform in curtailing cross-border medical care and costs does not appear to 
stem from the reduction in a particular type of procedure or surgical intervention, such as those 
with a higher cost; nor does it appear to have significantly changed the duration of treatment, 
mortality, or patient demographic traits of individuals seeking care (such as age, gender, or 
origin).  Rather, it seems to stem from widespread reductions in the number of non-residents 
seeking admission and readmission.  Overall, the findings are informative of prospective 
patients’ responses to health care regulations and, more specifically, of the impact of alike 
policies on the provision of cross-border medical care in the EU context and similarly regulated 
multinational agreements. This is important in light of the increase in cross-border medical care 
and the lack of a uniform health care coverage menu with the EU, which creates an incentive 
to seek care in other EU countries covering the treatment in question. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows.  Section 2 describes the institutional 
framework.  Section 3 presents the data used in the analysis and some descriptive evidence. 
Section 4 explains the methodology, whereas Section 5 discusses the main findings, along with 
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identification and robustness checks.  Section 6 contemplates plausible channels, and Section 
7 concludes.  
2. Institutional Framework 
  According to the existing EU regulation (1408/71 of 14th June 1971, 574/72 of 21st 
March 1972, 883/2004 of 1st May 2010 and 987/2009 of 1st May 2010), nationals from any of 
the 27 EU countries, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland are entitled to receive 
the same health care treatment in the same conditions as nationals from those countries when 
they are visiting.  Since 2010 (1231/2010 of 29th December 2010), this rule has also applied 
to third country nationals who are legal residents in the EU (except in Denmark, Iceland, 
Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland).  Individuals insured by the health care system of one 
of the EU countries listed above are entitled to receive the same type of care as nationals from 
the country of destination, regardless of whether they are temporarily visiting or permanently 
residing in that host country (Directive 2011/24/EU of 9th March 2011). 
Each country should reimburse other nations for the medical expenses incurred by its 
nationals.  The Administrative Commission on Social Security for Migrant Workers is the 
European Commission’s organism in charge of coordinating agreements and reimbursement 
procedures between member countries.  However, problems arise when the medical treatment 
received in the destination country is not covered by the health care system of the origin 
country.  For example, at the end of 2009, unreimbursed costs amounted to 138 million euros 
(Tribunal de Cuentas, 2012) –a figure that typically excludes pharmaceutical services.  
Estimates suggest that, in 2009, Spain required the reimbursement of 441,181,488 euros for 
medical treatments provided to citizens from the EU26, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and 
Switzerland.  In the same year, the Spanish government received claims from these countries 
that only amounted to 46,185,639 for the treatment received by Spanish citizens in one of these 
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countries (Tribunal de Cuentas, 2012).  This large difference is because Spain is a net receiver 
of medical tourism and has a sizeable community of foreign residents.5 
 In addition to the above-mentioned EU-wide regulations, there are bilateral 
international agreements.  In 2012, Spain had 20 bilateral agreements signed with third 
countries.6  Healthcare is included in seven of those 20 countries –namely, Andorra, Brazil, 
Chile, Ecuador, Morocco, Peru, and Tunisia.  
Due to difficulties arising with the reimbursement of medical expenses incurred by 
foreigners, in January 2012, one of the 19 Spanish regions (i.e. Valencia) decided to directly 
charge non-residents treated in their hospitals.7  The aim was to ensure payment of any medical 
procedures –an expense patients could later seek reimbursement for in their respective home 
countries.  This eliminated the need to go through the European-wide reimbursement 
mechanism.  The policy change was approved through the Law 9/2011 on fiscal measures, 
administrative and financial management, and organization of the Generalitat on December 26, 
2011.8  It was announced by the Vice-President of the regional government at that time in a 
press conference held on the same day of the measure’s approval during which it was stressed 
that “medical tourism was over in Valencia”.9 
 
5 In addition to these two factors, the proximity of countries in Europe and the availability of affordable flights 
between EU countries have contributed to the proliferation of online providers of planned health tourism.  These 
online companies offer packages that include accommodation, flights, and medical interventions in the destination 
country.  For example, “Medical Tourism Corporation”, a U.S. based company, ranks Spain among the top 
destination countries for health tourism because of the quality of the health care system and other country 
amenities, such as culture, food, beaches, etc. 
6 Spain currently has bilateral agreements with Andorra, Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Cape Verde, Canada, Chile, 
Colombia, Korea, Ecuador, United States, Philippines, Japan, Morocco, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Dominican 
Republic, Russia, Tunisia, Ukraine, Uruguay and Venezuela.  More information can be found at: http://www.seg-
social.es/wps/portal/wss/internet/InformacionUtil/32078/32253?changeLanguage=en.  
7 Over the period under examination, Spanish regions have autonomy and legislative powers over several topics, 
including health.   
8 A few days later (5th January 2012), another Decreto-Ley 1/2012 laid down some additional details on the 
implementation of the Ley 9/2011 of 26th December. 




Valencia ranks among the top destinations for cross-border medical care in Spain.  
Close to 40 percent of all medical expenses incurred by the Spanish public health care system 
associated to the provision of cross-border medical care occurs in Valencia (Tribunal de 
Cuentas, 2012).  Within the region of Valencia, the province of Alicante receives the second 
largest flow of medical tourists in Spain, mostly from the United Kingdom, Nordic countries, 
The Netherlands, and France.  The typical individual seeking cross-border medical care is 
familiar with the region (has vacationed or resided there, possibly received health care before) 
and is advised by a firm that facilitates the provision of such services (Escuela de Organización 
Industrial, 2013).  
In practical terms, European individuals seeking medical treatment in Spain should 
follow several steps, including checking with the Spanish hospital for available dates for the 
operation, processing any lab tests needed prior to the procedure and discussing the 
intervention with their home country general practitioner (GP), among other things.10  
Additionally, for some specific types of operations, individuals might need to ask for 
authorization from the home-country National Health Service.  Typically, this information is 
available online for most European country members.11  However, due to the language and 
bureaucratic barriers that individual patients may encounter when arranging a medical 
intervention abroad, a number of companies have started to market cross-border medical care 
packages that include trip, accommodation, needed paperwork, lab work, and medical 
intervention for a price that, in many occasions, is still substantially lower than the cost of the 
same procedure in the home country.12  
 
10 More information can be found at: https://europa.eu/youreurope/citizens/health/unplanned-healthcare/going-to-
doctor-hospital-abroad/index_en.htm   
11 For instance, in the U.K., the information is available at: https://www.nhs.uk/using-the-nhs/healthcare-
abroad/going-abroad-for-treatment/going-abroad-for-medical-treatment/ 
12 One example is “treatmentabroad” at https://www.treatmentabroad.com/ 
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3. Data and Some Descriptive Evidence 
To evaluate the impact of the reform on cross-border medical care, we use data on 
hospitalizations from the Spanish Minimum Set of Basic Data (MSBD). The MSBD is a 
clinical-administrative database provided by the Ministry of Health, Consumption and Social 
Welfare.  It gathers data directly from public hospitals and contains administrative and detailed 
medical records on hospitalizations at discharge.  We use data from 2008 to 2015 –namely, 
from four years prior to and four years after the reform.  For each entry, the database provides 
information on some basic individual and hospital characteristics, length of hospital stays, 
diagnosis, procedures, mortality, and estimated cost.13  
Our sample excludes children and pregnant women because these populations enjoy 
free access to care.14  In addition, we remove hospitalizations due to traffic or work accidents, 
since they should not be considered cross-border medical care, as well as those with unknown 
or wrong diagnostic coding.15  We use information on the patient’s region of residence to 
identify non-resident hospitalizations for each region.  We work with 17 of the 19 Spanish 
regions as we cannot include Navarra and La Rioja since the database does not allow us to 
identify non-resident hospitalizations.16  In addition, although in robustness checks we 
experiment with including it, we exclude the region of Andalucía from the main analysis.  
Although there is no policy that has been specifically introduced in Andalucía to charge 
patients for incurred hospitalization costs, as in the case of Valencia, there is evidence in some 
 
13 See Table C in the appendix for further detail. 
14 Under Organic Law 4/2000 and Royal Decree 16//2012. 
15 GRDAP=470. 
16 In some instances, the region of residence is unknown.  This is the case for those residing in Spain and lacking 
access to public healthcare when the law is enacted.  Similarly, as noted by Chapaprieta et al. (2015), that would 
also be the case for individuals residing abroad, and for those seeking health care in a region other than the one in 
which they reside.  Hence, hospitalizations among non-residents are underestimated.  
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media outlets of some hospitals in the region directly charging non-residents for procedures.17  
Therefore, as there seems to be evidence of a non-formalized change in charging behavior in 
that region, we conduct our analysis excluding Andalucía from both the treated and the control 
groups, to later include it in the treated group in robustness checks.  In sum, since the request 
of direct payment for services from non-residents was only officially introduced in Valencia, 
that region constitutes the treated region, which we compare to the rest of control regions 
included in the study.18  
Panel A of Figure 1 shows the number (dots) of non-resident hospitalizations for each 
trimester before and after the reform in Valencia (left panel) vs. the remaining regions (right 
panel).  We fit a linear trend to the pre-reform and post-reform observations to graphically 
identify any break in the trend in response to the policy adoption (shaded areas capture 95% 
confidence intervals).  There was a clear reduction in the number of hospitalizations in Valencia 
following the policy implementation from an average of 750/trimester to close to 50/trimester 
–a 90 percent drop.  In contrast, in the control regions, hospitalizations did not significantly 
change from before to after the policy change implemented by Valencia.   
At this juncture, a couple of facts are worth pointing out.  First, there was no apparent 
“race to the bottom” –that is, other Spanish regions did not legislate a policy similar to the one 
adopted by Valencia, despite their ability to do so.  Second, there was no apparent spillover 
impacts on the remaining Spanish regions, which could have prompted other regions to follow 
on Valencia’s steps.  A potential reason for the lack of spillover impacts can be found in 
patients’ self-reports when asked about the factors driving their decision to seek cross-border 
care, which point to their familiarity with the region as a primary driver.  For instance, survey 
 
17 Some hospitals in Andalucía required direct payment for the procedures performed from non-residents, e.g. 
https://www.lavanguardia.com/local/sevilla/20121107/54354259730/condenan-al-pago-de-2-265-euros-a-un-
extranjero-por-la-asistencia-dada-en-el-hospital-costa-del-sol.html.    
18 Non-treated regions include Balearic Islands, Castilla-La Mancha, Madrid, Murcia, Ceuta, Melilla, and Castilla–
León, Aragón, Asturias, Canary Islands, Cantabria, Cataluña, Extremadura, Galicia, and Basque Country.   
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data from the Flash Eurobarometer administered by the European Commission in 2007 shows 
that Europeans are much more likely to travel abroad to receive medical treatment if they have 
already received some medical assistance in that location before (Flash Eurobarometer, 2007).  
Similarly, lack of familiarity with the destination is identified as an important factor 
discouraging individuals from seeking medical care abroad.  This suggests that many of those 
seeking care in Valencia were probably familiar with the area and only considered seeking care 
in that location, not necessarily in other Spanish regions they might be unfamiliar with.   
In consonance with the results in Panel A of Figure 1, there is a significant reduction in 
the cost associated to the hospitalization of non-residents in Valencia after the policy was 
implemented from 5 million euros in the first quarter of 2011 to half a million euros right after 
(Panel B of Figure 1).  In contrast, in the remaining Spanish regions, total costs per quarter 
remained roughly unchanged.  Overall, the descriptive evidence in Figure 1 hints on the policy 
effectiveness in curtailing non-resident hospitalizations and costs.     
From a public health point of view, it is important to identify which treatments and costs 
were responsible for the observed response.  The MSBD contains detailed information on 
diagnostics, which allow us to determine the most treated diseases and the estimated cost of 
treatment.  In Table 1, we use that information to descriptively examine changes in 
hospitalizations from before to after the first quarter of 2012, in Valencia versus the control 
regions, according to Mayor Diagnostic Category.19  Hospitalizations due to diseases and 
disorders related to the musculoskeletal, circulatory, digestive, respiratory and nervous systems 
all experienced very large reductions.  Together, they accounted for more than 70 percent of 
the decrease in hospitalizations. 
 
19 The Mayor Diagnostic Category is a group of diagnostics which is divided in 25 groups plus an additional 
category that cannot be included in the previous one. Note that we do not report pregnant diagnostic category 
since we remove pregnant women from the analysis.     
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Table 2 repeats the same exercise, although focusing on the estimated average cost (in 
thousands of euros) of each hospitalization.  The largest savings originate from diagnoses 
responsible for most hospitalizations, such as diseases and disorders related to the 
musculoskeletal, circulatory, digestive, respiratory and nervous systems.  They accounted for 
67 percent of the cost savings.  The most expensive diagnoses (pre-MDC and human 
immunodeficiency/virus infections) only dropped by 1.2 percent,20 but they lowered costs by 
5.5 percent.  
In sum, the descriptive statistics in Figure 1 and Table A in the appendix uncover 
significant reductions in non-resident hospitalizations and costs in Valencia, when compared 
to other regions, after 2011.  In addition, Table 1 and Table 2 document how the observed 
reduction in non-resident hospitalizations and costs did not disproportionally impact a few 
diagnoses.    
4. Methodology  
Thus far, we have provided descriptive evidence of the impact of the reform on cross-
border hospitalizations and related costs.  In what follows, we conduct a more thorough 
analysis relying on a quasi-natural experimental approach that compares changes in both 
outcomes (non-resident hospitalization and costs) before and after the policy change, across 
treated and control regions, while accounting for regional and temporal fixed-effects, as well 
as linear or treated-region specific time trends.  To that end, we estimate the following 
benchmark model:     
(1)  𝑦𝑟𝑞𝑦 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑞𝑦 + 𝛽2𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑟 + 𝛽3(𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑞𝑦 𝑥 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑟) +  µ𝑟 +
𝛿𝑞+ 𝜆𝑦 + 𝑟𝑞𝑦 
 
20 The pre-MDC diagnosis includes transplants, tracheostomies, as well as wrong diagnoses, contributing to its 
higher-than-average costs.        
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where 𝑦𝑟𝑞𝑦 is the outcome of interest (number or hospitalizations or total cost) in region r, 
quarter q and year y.  𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑞𝑦 is a dummy variable equal to 1 after the reform; that is, the first 
quarter of 2012 onward.  𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑟 is an indicator for the treated region –namely, Valencia.
21  
The model includes region fixed effects (µ𝑟), quarter fixed effects (𝛿𝑞) and year fixed effects 
(𝜆𝑦).  Standard errors are bootstrapped.    
The causal effect of the reform would be captured by 𝛽3, which can be interpreted as 
the change in non-residents’ hospitalizations and their corresponding cost induced by the 
reform.  Note that the specification already controls for changes over time in the dependent 
variable, as well as for average differences between non-resident patients across treated and 
control regions.  The identification assumption is that trends in the two outcomes would have 
been the same in treated and control regions in the absence of the policy change.  We thus 
include either region-specific time trends (r*t) or treated region-specific time trend (𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑟*t).  
Additionally, in an event study, we will explore if the trends in non-resident hospitalizations 
and costs already differed in Valencia, when compared to the control regions, prior to the 
change in the billing policy.   
5. Did the Reform Reduce Cross-border Medical Care? 
5.1.  Main Findings 
Our primary goal is to learn about the effectiveness of the reform in reducing cross-
border medical care costs by ensuring the upfront payment for services provided to non-
residents.  To that end, Table 3 shows the difference-in-difference estimate of the reform on 
those two outcomes based on three model specifications of equation (1) that progressively add 
controls.  Specification (1) includes regional, trimester and year fixed-effects; specification (2) 
 
21 In robustness checks, we experiment with adding Andalucía, where informal reports are suggestive of a similar 
practice to the one followed by Valencia, to the treated group. 
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adds region-specific time trends; and specification (3) adds a treated region-specific time trend 
to the first model specification –allowing us to check the common trends assumption.  Results 
are rather consistent, regardless of the model specification being used.  Based on the last and 
most complete model specification, the reform lowered hospitalization costs associated to non-
residents by 4.8 million euros/trimester in Valencia, when compared to other autonomous 
communities.  This substantial savings originated from a sharp reduction in hospitalizations 
among non-residents of roughly 800/trimester –a 98 percent drop.    
5.2.  Identification 
The estimates in Table 3 rely on a difference-in-difference estimation that assumes that 
the outcomes being examined were no different prior to the adopted measures in treated vs. 
control region.  To gauge the parallel pre-trends assumption, as well as to evaluate outcome 
dynamics following the reform, we conduct an event study for each outcome –namely, the 
number of non-resident hospitalizations in the region and its associated cost.  To that end, we 
estimate the following equation:  
(2)  𝑦𝑟𝑞𝑦 = 𝛽0 + ∑ 𝛽1,𝑞𝑦
15
𝑞𝑦=−15 𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑞𝑦 + 𝛽2𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑟 +
∑ 𝛽3,𝑞𝑦(𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑞𝑦 𝑥 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑟)𝑟𝑞𝑦
15
𝑞𝑦=−15 + +µ𝑟+ 𝑟𝑞𝑦 
where 𝑦𝑟𝑞𝑦 continues to stand for the number of hospitalizations or total cost in region r, quarter 
q and year y.  We examine the existence of pre-trends up to 15 trimesters prior, as well as 
outcome dynamics up to 15 trimesters after the reform.  Figure 2 displays the coefficients from 
the event study (𝛽3), along with 95 percent confidence intervals.  All estimates for the periods 
prior to the reform are close to zero, strongly supporting the assumption of no differential pre-
trends.  In addition, there is a clear break in the trend in both the number of hospitalizations 
(Panel A), as well as in its total cost (Panel B), surrounding the adoption of the policy.  Both 
significantly drop and stay down thereafter.  The persistence of the reform’s impacts is 
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suggestive of its effectiveness in curtailing cross-border medical care and its cost in the 
medium- and long-run.   
To dissipate additional identification concerns, we also conduct a series of placebo 
checks.  Specifically, we experiment with shifting the adoption of the policy by one trimester 
at a time.  Figure 3 illustrates the distribution of the new point estimates (Panel A), as well as 
the cumulative distribution of t-values from those regressions (Panel B) when compared to a 
zero-mean normal distribution.  As shown therein, the point estimates from the placebo 
interventions are almost always lower than our estimated effect (indicated by the dashed 
vertical line) and as expected, centered around zero.  Furthermore, a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test 
of normality of the empirical distribution of the placebo t-values cannot be rejected at 
conventional significance levels.  As such, the placebo reforms would have no significant 
impact on either non-resident hospitalizations or their associated cost.   
5.3.  Robustness Checks 
 We next perform several robustness checks aimed at gauging the reliability of the 
estimates in Table 3 to changes in the sample period, the control group, the treated group, and 
the estimation methodology.  Columns (1) and (2) of Table 4 display the results from our first 
robustness check, where we experiment with restricting the sample to a 3-year period around 
treatment to better gauge the impact of the adopted measures.  Results prove remarkably robust.  
Estimates become, if anything, slightly larger, lowering regional medical costs by 5.4 million 
euros/trimester (vs. 4.8 million) as hospitalizations drop by 909/trimester (vs. 800) in Valencia.   
Next, we experiment with altering the control group.  Causal inference ultimately 
depends on having similar treated and control groups.  To that end, we use data from the Hotel 
Occupancy Survey (INE) and select regions that, as Valencia, have more than one million of 
travelers per year (see Appendix C).  This exercise results in a different control group composed 
of the following regions: Cataluña, Balearic Island, Canary Island, Madrid, Galicia, Basque 
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Country, and Castile-Leon.  Using this new control group, we repeat our analyses.  As shown 
in columns (3) and (4) of Table 4, the estimates continue to prove remarkably robust.   
In a similar vein, we explore altering the control group by removing control regions –
one at a time.  Figure 4 displays graphically the estimated impacts of the reform from each of 
those regressions for the two outcomes we focus on.  As can be seen in Panel A of Figure 4, 
the reform continued to lower hospitalizations by roughly 800/trimester, regardless of which 
control region was being removed.  Similarly, costs dropped by 4.8 million euros/trimester 
independently of the control region being removed.  In sum, the estimates are not driven by 
one specific control region.   
In columns (5) and (6) of Table 4, we try changing the treated group.  As pointed out 
earlier, we include Andalucía in the treated group together with Valencia because, although 
there was no formal normative change, there is evidence of informal advice to charge foreigners 
directly for some procedures.  As can be seen in the last columns of Table 4, our results prove 
robust to this robustness check.  The reform lowered hospitalizations by 500/trimester and 
overall costs by 2.9 million euros/trimester.  
To conclude, we experiment with conducting the analysis using two alternative 
methodologies.  First, we use a regression discontinuity (RD) design exploiting the fact that 
reform was introduced in January 2012 to estimate the following model:  
(3)     𝑦𝑟𝑞𝑦 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑞𝑦 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑞𝑦 + 𝛽3(𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑞𝑦𝑥 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑞𝑦) + 𝑟𝑞𝑦 
where 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑞𝑦 stands for a linear trend of our running variable by quarter, and 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑞𝑦 is a 
binary indicator equal to 1 for the post-reform period.  We also allow for a differential trend 
after the reform (𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑞𝑦𝑥 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑞𝑦).  Therefore, the coefficient on 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑞𝑦 identifies jumps in 
the dependent variable at the time of the reform –namely, in January 2012.  Finally, to check 
the robustness of our findings to the use of non-linear trends, we also experiment with adding 
a quadratic pre-reform trend and a quadratic post-reform trend.  Table 5 displays the results 
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from this exercise.  As shown therein, the reform lowered hospitalizations in Valencia by 
760/trimester in the most complete model specification –a 92 percent reduction.  Additionally, 
it cut total costs by 4.5 million euros/trimester.   
Second, we experiment with estimating the impact of the reform using a synthetic 
control method approach.  In Figure 5, Panel A, we display the results for the total number of 
hospitalizations.  The results for overall costs in thousands of euros are shown in Panel B.  In 
both cases, we observe similar pre-reform trends in treated and synthetic control regions, which 
ends up being Cataluña –a non-surprising result considering the similarities of the 
hospitalization system and the use by foreigners of the system in the two regions.  As previously 
found using the difference-in-differences and regression discontinuity design methodologies, 
there is a strong reduction in both hospitalizations and costs immediately after the reform –a 
decline driven by the change in the treated region.  In contrast, hospitalizations and costs 
display trends like the ones prior to the reform.   
In conclusion, the robustness checks confirm the results from our baseline specification, 
enhancing the credibility and reliability of the estimates and conclusions.   
6. Mechanisms 
Thus far, we have shown that the reform adopted by Valencia significantly curtailed 
non-resident hospitalizations and costs.  The impacts did not predate the reform, proved long-
lasting, and are not observed when alternative reform dates are used as a placebo.  Finally, the 
effects of the policy change prove robust to cutting the sample to narrow window around 
treatment, altering the control and treated groups, and to the use of alternative methodologies.  
In this section, we aim to learn about the mechanisms at play by gaining a better understanding 
of the types of procedures most responsive to the policy and the effects of the reform on 




6.1.  Heterogenous Impacts by Type of Intervention 
 Table 6 provides further insight into the mechanisms at play by looking at how various 
types of interventions were impacted by the reform.  The first two columns in Table 6 
differentiate according to whether the intervention required surgery.  As shown therein, both 
surgical and non-surgical medical attention dropped by similar percentages –between 94 and 
98 percent, respectively.  Further information on the type of intervention affected by the reform 
is provided in columns (3) through (9).  There were similarly large and significant reductions 
in interventions related to the musculoskeletal and circulatory systems, including hip implants 
and pacemakers.  Similarly, cataract procedures were cut by two and a half times.   
In sum, the reform led to very large reductions in all medical interventions, with and 
without surgery, as well as across all the most typical procedures, including hip and pacemaker 
implants or cataracts.     
6.2.  Heterogeneous Impacts by Patients’ Age, Gender and Country of Origin 
 We next look at whether the reform impacted differently patients by gender, age, or 
country of origin.  As shown in Table 7, there were significant reductions among both male 
and female patients, as well as among younger and older patients.  We also look at the 
nationalities of treated patients –information that is unfortunately not available for most 
regions.  However, we do have the data for Valencia, which we use to tabulate changes in the 
origin of patients before and after the adoption of the reform.  Once again, as in Tables 6 and 
7, we observe large reductions across the board, even though most patients were originally 
coming from the U.K., Germany, and France (see Table 8).  Figures A and B in the appendix 
provide us with a different view of the ongoing changes.  Prior to the reform, approximately 
93 percent of patients in Valencia originated from Europe.  After the reform, that share is not 
substantially different, at about 89 percent (see Figure A), even though the reductions occurred, 
primarily, among patients originating from Europe (Figure B).   
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In sum, the effectiveness of the reform did not rely on the selection of patients based on 
their gender, age, origin, nor on the type of intervention sought.   
6.3.  Heterogeneous Impacts by Intervention Attributes 
Finally, we use the individual level data on the resources associated to the 
treatment/intervention sought by non-residents, its anticipated vs. unanticipated nature, 
duration of treatment, readmissions, mortality, as well as individual intervention costs to further 
understand which intervention parameters were impacted by the reform.  Uncovering this 
information sheds some light on selective changes and, in turn, on the mechanisms at play.   
To that end, we re-formulate the model in equation (1) to gauge the effect of the reform 
on non-residents’ choice of treatment/intervention, duration of treatment, length of hospital 
stays, readmissions, mortality and expenditures incurred using case level data, as follows:  
(4)  𝑦𝑖𝑟𝑞𝑦 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑞𝑦 + 𝛽2𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑟 + 𝛽3(𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑞𝑦 𝑥 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑟) + µ𝑟 + 𝛿𝑞+ 𝜆𝑦 + 𝑖𝑟𝑞𝑦 
The regressors, now referred to individual patients, coincide with those in equation (1).  The 
dependent variable denotes the outcomes noted above.  Table 9 displays the results after 
including a treated region-specific time trend.  Standard errors are bootstrapped.   
The reform only marginally increased the per unit cost of sought procedures, but not 
the estimated consumption of resources, the duration of the hospitalization, or mortality.  The 
implemented change in billing only seems to have lowered the number of scheduled 
hospitalizations and readmissions by 45 percent and 73 percent, respectively.  Therefore, these 
results highlight the fact that the new direct billing system introduced by the reform reduced 
scheduled hospitalizations, as would be expected.   
All in all, the estimates in Tables 6, 7 and 9, along with the descriptive statistics in Table 
8 and Figures A and B in the appendix, reveal the broad reduction in cross-border medical care, 
which did not concentrate among certain demographics (as captured by gender, age, origin) 
nor on specific medical interventions.  Similarly, declines occurred for all sorts of medical 
19 
 
procedures (i.e. with or without surgery, as well as with higher or lower estimated resource 
consumption) without significantly altering the duration of treatment or mortality.  Rather, non-
citizens became 45 percent less likely to schedule a hospitalization in Valencia and, among 
those who did, readmissions dropped by 73 percent.      
7. Summary and Conclusions 
Cross-border care is a relatively unexplored topic in the health literature due, in part, to 
difficulties in finding adequate data.  Yet, cross-border medical care is rather extensive, and 
can impose a significant financial burden on some nations.  We focus on Spain –a country 
receiving most of its foreign patients from the European Union (EU).  In the EU context, 
nationals from any of the 27 EU countries, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland 
visiting another of these countries, are entitled to receive the same health care treatment in the 
same conditions than nationals from those countries.  While, in principle, the cost associated 
with treating these patients should be reimbursed by the non-resident’s country members, this 
is often not the case due to the distinct health coverage offered by each country.       
We examine the impact of a reform introduced in 2012 in Valencia, Spain, to curtail 
cross-border medical care costs.  Using administrative data on all interventions to non-residents 
in the country, along with a quasi-experimental approach, we find that the reform significantly 
curtailed non-resident hospitalizations by 98 percent and lowered medical cost by 4.8 million 
euros/trimester.  We also explore the channels through which such reductions took place to 
gauge any disproportionate impact by type of patient, procedure, or outcomes in order to learn 
about selection biases emanating from the policy change.  We find that the reform uniformly 
reduced hospitalizations and readmissions for most medical procedures, regardless of whether 
they were estimated to consume more resources or required surgical interventions.  In addition, 
the reform had no significant impact on the type of patient admitted (as captured by age, gender, 
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or country of origin), nor on the duration of the hospital stay or on mortality.  It uniformly 
reduced scheduled hospitalizations by 45 percent, and readmissions by 73 percent.   
One might wonder about the welfare implications of the impacts documented in this 
study.  While we cannot gauge the well-being effects on foreigners seemingly choosing to be 
treated elsewhere, we can get a sense of what the yearly savings of 20 million euros –amounting 
to 0.3 percent of the health care budget of Valencia in 2011– represent for the region.  Given 
the current salary scales for doctors and nurses in the public health care sector in Spain, the 
yearly cost savings would allow for the hiring of an additional 600 nurses or 325 doctors in a 
system that, as made evident by the COVID-19 pandemic, is deficient in medical personnel.   
Overall, the findings extend our understanding of medical travel by providing causal 
evidence on the impact of the policy introduced in Valencia, Spain, in containing the financial 
burden imposed by cross-border medical care.  In the absence of more equitable and 
enforceable reimbursement agreements, directly billing patients, who may later seek 
reimbursement in their home countries for the incurred medical expenses, can prove effective 
in reducing the cost burden borne by some regions.  This is important considering the increase 
in cross-border medical care and the lack of a uniform health care coverage menu in the EU 
context, which creates incentives to seek care in other EU countries covering the treatment in 
question.   
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Table 1: Hospitalizations by Type of Diagnosis  
Mayor Diagnostic Category 
Percent  Treated Region Non-Treated Regions DD 
(DT-DC) Distribution Pre Post DT Pre Post DC 
Diseases and Disorders of the Musculoskeletal System and Connective Tissue 16% 2,092 168 -1,924 2801 2877 76 -2,000 
Diseases and Disorders of the Circulatory System 16% 2,474 206 -2,268 2593 2654 61 -2,329 
Diseases and Disorders of the Digestive System 12% 1,530 127 -1,403 2121 2320 199 -1,602 
Diseases and Disorders of the Respiratory System 12% 1,573 130 -1,443 2167 2126 -41 -1,402 
Diseases and Disorders of the Nervous System 11% 1,607 172 -1,435 1802 1959 157 -1,592 
Diseases and Disorders of the Hepatobiliary System and Pancreas 5% 782 57 -725 894 945 51 -776 
Diseases and Disorders of the Kidney and Urinary Tract 5% 470 43 -427 774 954 180 -607 
Diseases and Disorders of the Skin, Subcutaneous Tissue and Breast 3% 294 31 -263 591 517 -74 -189 
Mental Diseases and Disorders 3% 342 43 -299 436 528 92 -391 
Diseases and Disorders of the Ear Nose, Mouth and Throat 2% 268 21 -247 428 335 -93 -154 
Injuries, Poison and Toxic Effect of Drugs 2% 214 39 -175 342 389 47 -222 
Infectious and Parasitic DDs (Systemic or unspecified sites) 2% 249 28 -221 280 374 94 -315 
Diseases and Disorders of the Endocrine, Nutritional and Metabolic System  2% 213 18 -195 314 288 -26 -169 
Diseases and Disorders of the Female Reproductive System 2% 175 12 -163 311 291 -20 -143 
Pre-MDC 1% 130 18 -112 271 226 -45 -67 
Myeloproliferative DDs (Poorly Differentiated Neoplasms) 1% 104 5 -99 186 166 -20 -79 
Factors Influencing Health Status and Other Contacts with Health Services 1% 72 9 -63 154 212 58 -121 
Diseases and Disorders of the Blood and Blood Forming Organs and  1% 109 5 -104 162 165 3 -107 
Human Immunodeficiency Virus Infection  1% 60 7 -53 152 182 30 -83 
Diseases and Disorders of the Male Reproductive System 1% 73 5 -68 131 186 55 -123 
Alcohol/Drug Use or Induced Mental Disorders 1% 111 13 -98 134 96 -38 -60 
Diseases and Disorders of the Eye 1% 87 3 -84 102 121 19 -103 
Multiple Significant Trauma 0% 66 3 -63 52 103 51 -114 
Burns 0% 32 3 -29 48 44 -4 -25 
All 100% 13,127 1,166 -11,961 17,246 18,058 812 -12,773 





Table 2: Total Cost of Hospitalizations by Type of Diagnosis (in thousands of €) 
Mayor Diagnostic Category 
Average Cost Treated Region Non-Treated Regions DD 
(DT-DC)  per Patient Pre Post DT Pre Post DC 
Diseases and Disorders of the Musculoskeletal System and Connective Tissue 5 10,711 781 -9,931 13,463 14,999 1,536 -11,467 
Diseases and Disorders of the Circulatory System 5 12,649 1,062 -11,586 14,012 14,268 256 -11,842 
Diseases and Disorders of the Digestive System 5 7,499 557 -6,943 9,598 10,242 644 -7,587 
Diseases and Disorders of the Respiratory System 4 6,261 510 -5,751 9,112 9,144 32 -5,783 
Diseases and Disorders of the Nervous System 6 8,407 1,057 -7,350 10,820 11,449 630 -7,980 
Diseases and Disorders of the Hepatobiliary System and Pancreas 5 3,730 273 -3,457 4,070 4,576 506 -3,963 
Diseases and Disorders of the Kidney and Urinary Tract 4 1,704 135 -1,569 2,707 3,510 803 -2,372 
Diseases and Disorders of the Skin, Subcutaneous Tissue and Breast 4 1,061 112 -949 2,203 1,876 -327 -622 
Mental Diseases and Disorders 6 1,863 324 -1,539 2,396 3,974 1,578 -3,117 
Diseases and Disorders of the Ear Nose, Mouth and Throat 3 799 53 -746 1,410 1,026 -385 -361 
Injuries, Poison and Toxic Effect of Drugs 5 1,008 155 -852 1,574 1,771 198 -1,050 
Infectious and Parasitic DDs (Systemic or unspecified sites) 6 1,625 160 -1,466 1,628 2,308 680 -2,146 
Diseases and Disorders of the Endocrine, Nutritional and Metabolic System  4 934 69 -865 1,346 1,220 -126 -739 
Diseases and Disorders of the Female Reproductive System 4 637 33 -604 1,119 1,069 -50 -554 
Pre-MDC 57 8,785 1,116 -7,669 16,077 11,049 -5,027 -2,642 
Myeloproliferative DDs (Poorly Differentiated Neoplasms) 8 966 29 -938 1,345 1,370 25 -963 
Factors Influencing Health Status and Other Contacts with Health Services 4 167 31 -135 699 1,013 313 -449 
Diseases and Disorders of the Blood and Blood Forming Organs and  4 436 20 -417 652 642 -10 -407 
Human Immunodeficiency Virus Infection  17 1,089 119 -971 2,844 2,886 42 -1,013 
Diseases and Disorders of the Male Reproductive System 3 234 11 -223 432 659 226 -450 
Alcohol/Drug Use or Induced Mental Disorders 4 404 60 -344 439 462 24 -368 
Diseases and Disorders of the Eye 4 357 10 -347 386 394 8 -355 
Multiple Significant Trauma 8 375 84 -291 433 913 480 -771 
Burns 11 288 40 -247 589 480 -109 -138 
All 5 71,991 6,799 -65,191 99,354 101,301 1,947 -67,138 




Table 3                                                                                                                                                                         
Difference-in-Difference Estimates of the Effect of the Reform on Cross-border Medical Care  
Outcome: Hospitalizations Total Cost (in 1,000 euros) 
Column: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Post * Treated -750.946*** -800.107*** -800.107*** -4,082.574*** -4,786.445*** -4,786.445*** 
 (18.657) (40.750) (53.211) (175.410) (382.820) (344.845) 
       
Observations 512 512 512 512 512 512 
R-squared 0.871 0.896 0.871 0.879 0.902 0.881 
Dep. Var Mean 820.44 820.44 820.44 4,499.42 4,499.42 4,499.42 
Std. Deviation (91.81) (91.81) (91.81) (668.88) (668.88) (668.88) 
       
Region FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Trimester FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Linear Trend N Y N N Y N 
Treated Trend  N N  Y N N  Y 













Table 4                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
Robustness Checks  
Check No.: Check #1 Check #2 Check #3 
Specification: Using a 3-Year Window Around Treatment Using Regions with Similar Tourism Including Andalucía as a Treated Region 
Outcome: Hospitalizations Total Cost (in 1,000 euros) Hospitalizations Total Cost (in 1,000 euros) Hospitalizations Total Cost (in 1,000 euros) 
Column: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Post * Treated -909.917*** -5,338.634*** -797.444*** -4,741.954*** -492.079*** -2,893.719*** 
 (226.238) (1,401.876) (54.975) (405.049) (91.138) (477.806) 
       
Observations 403 403 256 256 544 544 
R-squared 0.848 0.862 0.866 0.875 0.818 0.828 
Dep. Var Mean 769.77 4,344.10 820.44 4,499.42 577.19 3,174.39 
Std. Deviation (233.97) (1,342.11) (91.98) (668.88) (256.83) (1,441.06) 
       
Region FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Trimester FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Linear Trend N N N N N N 
Treated Trend Y Y Y Y  Y Y 




Table 5                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
RDD Estimates of the Effect of the Reform on Cross-border Medical Care  
Outcome: Hospitalizations  Total Cost (in 1,000 euros) 
Column: (1) (2)  (1) (2) 
Post -808.213*** -757.365***  -4,888.113*** -4,540.666*** 
 (47.023) (73.259)  (284.893) (439.437) 
      
Observations 32 32  32 32 
R-squared 0.973 0.974  0.968 0.969 
Dep. Var Mean 820.44 820.44  4,499.42 4,499.42 
Std. Deviation (91.81) (91.81)  (668.88) (668.88) 
      
Linear Trend Y N  Y N 
Quadratic Trend N Y  N Y 
Different trend after the reform Y Y  Y Y 













Table 6                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
Mechanisms #1: DD Estimates of the Effect of the Reform on Frequent Medical Interventions 
Category: Surgery  Musculoskeletal System Circulatory System Eyes 




Column: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Post * Treated -226.893*** -573.214*** -127.07*** -95.733*** -8.566*** -133.116*** -35.930*** -3.746*** -0.459* 
 (15.741) (25.837) (8.449) (7.277) (1.498) (6.328) (3.459) (0.762) (0.253) 
          
Observations 512 512 512 512 512 512 512 512 512 
R-squared 0.844 0.876 0.859 0.853 0.694 0.889 0.861 0.506 0.195 
Dep. Var Mean 241.12 579.31 132.62 95.56 8.06 154.19 42.62 3 0.18 
Std. Deviation (34.10) (65.76) (19.30) (15.27) (2.26) (14.60) (6.5) (1.71) (0.40) 
      
  
  
Region FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Trimester FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Linear Trend Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Treated Trend Y Y Y Y  Y  Y  Y  Y Y 






Table 7                                                                                                                                                                                 
Mechanisms #2: DD Estimates of the Effect of the Reform by Gender and Age Groups 
Group: By Gender  By Group of Age   
Outcome: Women Men 18-34 35-54 55-74 +75 
Post * Treated -318.460*** -481.653*** -95.959*** -168.546*** -378.569*** -157.034*** 
 (18.427) (23.331) (12.969) (18.914) (12.581) (9.338) 
       
Observations 512 512 512 512 512 512 
R-squared 0.854 0.879 0.841 0.826 0.900 0.771 
Dep. Var Mean 324.37 496.06 106.87 168 391.19 154.37 
Std. Deviation (40.73) (52.91) (27.29) (45.51) (23.33) (15.97) 
       
Region FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Trimester FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Linear Trend N Y N N Y N 
Treated Trend  N N  Y N N  Y 





























Table 8                                                                                                                                                                               
Top Ten Hospitalizations by Country of Residence in Valencia                                                                          
(Number of hospitalizations per quarter) 
Origin Pre Post Var (%) 
U.K. 268 19 -93% 
Germany 115 6 -95% 
France 95 9 -91% 
Romania 53 2 -96% 
Belgium 27 3 -90% 
Norway 26 2 -92% 
Netherlands 24 4 -84% 
Sweden 24 2 -93% 
Italy 20 3 -85% 
Switzerland 14 2 -86% 






























Table 9                                                                                                                                                             
Mechanisms #3: DD Estimates of the Effect of the Reform on Based on Individual Case Traits 
Outcome Cost Resources 
Scheduled 
Hospitalizations 
Readmissions Duration Mortality 
Post * Treated 0.801* 0.158 -0.027** -0.044*** -0.403 -0.005 
 (0.412) (0.097) (0.013) (0.010) (0.410) (0.010) 
       
Observations 49,594 49,594 49,594 49,594 49,594 49,594 
R-squared 0.006 0.006 0.066 0.008 0.020 0.020 
Dep. Var Mean 5.48 1.20 0.06 0.06 6.68 0.05 
Std. Deviation (7.91) (1.66) (0.24) (0.23) (8.52) (0.21) 
       
Age, gender Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Region FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Trimester FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Linear Trend N N N N N N 
Treated Trend Y Y Y Y Y Y 






























Figure 1                                                                                                                                                                 
Cross-border Medical Care (2008-2015) 
Panel A: Hospitalizations  
 
Panel B: Total Cost (in 1,000 euros) 
 
 












































































































































































































































































Figure 2                                                                                                                                                                   
Event Study Figures 
Panel A: Hopitalizations 
 
 
Panel B: Total Cost (in 1,000 euros) 
 
Source: CMBD 2008-2015 and own elaboration. 
















































































































































































Panel A: Number of Hospitalizations 
 
Panel B: Total Cost (in thousands of euros) 
 











































































































(b) t-values from placebo estimates
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Figure 4                                                                                                                                                           
Sensitivity Analysis to Changes in the Control Group                                                                                      
(Removing One Region at a Time) 
Panel A: Hospitalizations 
 
 
Panel B: Total Cost (in 1,000 euros) 
 





















Figure 5                                                                                                                                                          
The Impact of the Reform using a Synthetic Control Methodology 
Panel A: Hospitalizations 
 
Panel B: Total Cost (in 1,000 euros) 
 










Table A                                                                                                                                                                           
Some Descriptive Statistics by Treated and Control Regions, Pre vs. Post the Policy Change 
Variable Average  
Treated Region  Non-Treated Regions DD 
Pre Post DT Pre Post DC (DT-DC) 
Hosp./ quarter 96.87 820.44 72.88 -446.66***      71.86 75.24 3.38 -750.94*** 
 (208.11) (22.95) (6.25) (23.14) (9.49) (11.94) (15.25) (59.49) 
         
Cost/ quarter 545.79 4,499.42 424.96 -4,074.46***   413.97 422.09 8.11 -4,082.57*** 
 (1,159.97) (167.22) (42.24) (172.47) (54.78) (66.04) (85.80) (335.71) 


















Table B                                                                                                                                                                       
Number of Travelers with Residence Abroad (in Millions) 
  2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Cataluña 8.19 8.34 7.81 9.01 9.90 9.94 10.26 10.41 10.75 
Baleares 6.57 6.39 5.70 6.15 6.97 7.30 7.44 7.43 7.65 
Andalucía 6.10 5.93 5.03 5.30 5.90 6.10 6.33 6.64 7.35 
Islas Canarias 4.75 4.94 4.20 4.75 5.69 5.70 6.04 6.64 6.79 
Madrid 3.81 3.81 3.65 4.30 4.67 4.30 4.04 4.47 4.95 
Valencia 2.45 2.45 2.11 2.20 2.28 2.45 2.69 2.72 2.86 
Castilla-León 0.83 0.82 0.74 0.81 0.84 0.83 0.89 0.95 1.04 
Galicia 0.73 0.69 0.64 0.73 0.72 0.74 0.83 0.98 1.16 
País Vasco 0.68 0.70 0.64 0.74 0.81 0.86 0.92 0.93 1.01 
Aragón 0.34 0.38 0.30 0.35 0.37 0.38 0.40 0.44 0.49 
Castilla-La Mancha 0.32 0.32 0.29 0.32 0.33 0.31 0.30 0.33 0.34 
Murcia 0.21 0.21 0.17 0.18 0.18 0.17 0.19 0.22 0.23 
Cantabria 0.18 0.19 0.17 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.20 0.19 0.20 
Navarra 0.18 0.17 0.16 0.17 0.18 0.19 0.22 0.24 0.26 
Asturias 0.17 0.17 0.15 0.17 0.18 0.18 0.19 0.22 0.25 
Extremadura 0.15 0.14 0.15 0.16 0.20 0.17 0.18 0.18 0.21 
La Rioja 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.11 
Ceuta 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 
Melilla 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 
All Regions 35.78 35.76 32.00 35.66 39.54 39.94 41.25 43.13 45.69 






















Table C: Variable Definition 




Total number of hospitalizations refers to the total number of new 
hospitalizations in a particular year and quarter.  
  
GRD-APR GRD-APR (or diagnosis related groups) is a system that groups patients 
with similar clinical characteristics like the risk of death and as well as 
its associated level severity, along with its consumption of resources.    
  
MDC CDM (or Mayor Diagnostic Category) classifies GRD-APR in 26 
categories.   
 
Cost Cost in euros. This value represents the estimated average cost of the 
GRD assigned to the hospitalization.  It does not imply this is the real 
cost of the treatment, especially in infrequent cases. 
  
Resources The GRD system attributes a relative weight to each GRD based on the 
required resources. It is obtained through an analytical accounting 
system and equals 1 if it requires the same resources as the average, less 
than 1 if it requires less resources than the average, and more than 1 if 
it requires more resources than the average. For instance, if the weight 
equals 2, it means that the hospitalization requires twice the resources 
that a hospitalization would require on average.   
 
Mortality Equals 1 if the patient dies.   
Readmissions  Equals 1 if the hospitalization is a readmission (in the same hospital and 
year within 30 days after the last hospitalization).  
  
Scheduled Hospitalizations Equals 1 if hospitalization has been scheduled.  
 
Duration Length of hospital stay in days.  



















Figure A                                                                                                                                                       
Distribution of Hospitalizations by Continent of Origin in Valencia (in percentages) 
 
Source: CMBD 2008-2015 and authors’ own tabulations.   
 
 
Figure B                                                                                                                                                               
Average Number of Hospitalizations per Quarter by Continent of Origen in Valencia 
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